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Abstract: In this article, I present an interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative 
value of friendship duties. The argument is divided in 
VII sections. In Section I, I provide brief summaries 
of the main arguments defended by me in a previous 
article about the normative consequences of virtue and 
utility friendships in Aristotle, the objectives that are to 
be defended in this article and of the conclusions that 
I take them to support. In section II, I offer an inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative 
value of friendship duties in cases where there is no 
practical conflict between friendship duties. In section 
III, I outline Aristotle’s theory about how we should 
deal with cases where there is such practical conflict. 
In the next sections, I analyze three other passages of 
the Aristotelian corpus where we have good reason to 
think that this kind of conflict appears, namely, NE, III 
1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol., III 10, 1286b23-28 (V) and 
Pol., VII 9, 1330a9-25 (VI), in order to flesh out the 
DANIEL SIMÃO NASCIMENTO 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
Aristotle on the Normative 
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outline presented in section III. In section VII I conclude with a summary 
of the argument. 
Key-words: Aristotle, friendship, duty, justice.
Sobre el valor normativo de los deberes de la amistad
 
Resumen: En este artículo presento una interpretación del 
pensamiento de Aristóteles en relación con el valor normativo de los deberes 
de la amistad. El trabajo está dividido en siete secciones. En la primera 
sección ofrezco un resumen de los argumentos principales que expuse en 
un artículo anterior acerca de las consecuencias normativas de las amistades 
basadas en la virtud y aquellas basadas en la utilidad. En esa misma sección 
expongo las tesis que defenderé y las conclusiones que de ellas se siguen. En la 
segunda sección, ofrezco una interpretación del pensamiento de Aristóteles 
en relación con el valor normativo de los deberes de la amistad en los casos 
en que no hay conflicto práctico entre ellos. En la tercera sección esbozo la 
teoría de Aristóteles acerca de cómo deberíamos proceder en los casos en 
que dichos conflictos se presentan. En las siguientes secciones analizo otros 
tres pasajes del corpus aristotélico en los que existen buenas razones para 
pensar que surge esta clase de conflicto: NE, III 1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol., III 
10, 1286b23-28 (V) y Pol., VII 9, 1330a9-25 (VI), con el objeto de ilustrar 
lo esbozado en la sección III. En la última sección recapitulo el argumento.
 
Palabras clave: Aristóteles, amistad, deber, justicia.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present an interpretation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties, and 
it should be read as a sequence to Nascimento 2017. In that paper, I used the 
expanded hohfeldian model offered in Wenar 2005 to argue that, according 
to Aristotle’s theory of friendship in the NE, in every bond of friendship that 
is based on utility or virtue the parties involved have a claim to the other’s pro-
portional cooperation to the attainment of the end of their friendship, which 
means they each have a duty to each other to cooperate accordingly, and a 
paired power to waive their own claim and the other’s corresponding duty. 
The thesis about the creation of duties in virtue and utility friendships 
was grounded in an analysis of the Aristotelian use of the word opheíle- ma. 
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According to the interpretation I defended, we can say that these bonds 
of friendship create duties because they create that which Aristotle calls an 
opheílema between friends (NE VIII 13, 1162b5-34; IX 2, 1164b23-1165a35), 
to have an opheílema in the sense of the word we find both in Aristotle and 
before him is to owe an action to somebody, and to owe an action to so-
mebody is to have a duty in the sense of the word that is pertinent here. 
The thesis about the creation of hohfeldian incidents in virtue and 
utility friendships, on the other hand, was grounded not only in Aristotle’s 
use of the term opheílema, but also in his talk of accusations (enklemata) and 
recriminations (mémpseis) between friends (NE VIII 13, 1162b5-34), and 
of a friend’s ability both to ‘liberate’ a friend of the performance of any 
actions that this friend owes to him because of their friendship (NE VIII 
14, 1163b18-23), or, alternatively, to exact (epizetéo) from him what their 
friendship allows (NE  VIII 14, 1163b13-18). 
The interpretation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative 
value of friendship duties presented in the following pages is divided in 
six sections. In section II I deal with the cases where there is no practical 
conflict between friendship duties, i.e. cases where an agent is faced with 
exclusive and exhaustive alternatives which consist, respectively, in satisfying 
or not satisfying a given friendship duty. In sections III, IV, V and VI I deal 
with the cases where there is practical conflict between friendship duties. In 
section III, I present the outlines of Aristotle’s theory about how we should 
deal with those cases. In the next sections, I flesh out the theory presented 
in section III by analyzing three other passages of the Aristotelian corpus 
where we have good reason to think about this kind of conflict, namely, 
NE III 1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol., III 10, 1286b23-28 (V) and Pol., VII 9, 
1330a9-25 (VI). In section VII, I conclude with a summary of the argument 
defended in the previous sections. Although these three passages have been 
the object of attention by several scholars, I am unaware of any previous 
attempt to interpret them not only in connection with each other, but also 
in connection with Aristotle’s theory about how we should choose between 
satisfying duties with different friends. 
If what is said bellow is correct we should conclude that, according 
to Aristotle:
(1) If an agent is in a situation where (a) he can fulfill a duty towards a 
friend, and (b) he has to choose between two exclusive and exhaustive options 
of which one is, or implies in, fulfilling his duty and the other is, or implies 
in, not fulfilling his duty, then (c) he should always fulfill his duty (section II). 
(2) When an agent must choose between satisfying obligations he 
owes to different friends he must do so by balancing their relative nobility 
and utility (section III).
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(3) If an agent is in a situation where (a) he can either fulfill an obli-
gation towards one friend or another, and one of them is more intimate to 
him than the other; (b) the satisfaction of both obligations can be attained 
by actions which would be equivalent in nobility and utility if they were 
aimed at friends he was equally intimate with; and (c) the deference of both 
obligations would be equivalent in nobility and utility if they were done 
to friends he was equally intimate with; then (d) the agent should prefer to 
satisfy the obligation he has towards his more intimate friend because, in this 
case, the intimacy of the relationship tips the balance of utility and nobility 
towards the satisfaction of that obligation (section III).
(4) According to what is said in NE III 1, all actions done in situa-
tions of practical conflict of the kind analyzed here are mixed actions of a 
kind, i.e. actions where the agent does something shameful for something 
noble, although maybe not all mixed actions are actions done in the situa-
tions of practical conflict analyzed here. Therefore, we should use Aristotle’s 
description of how we should react to mixed actions in NE III 1 as pres-
criptions on how we should react to actions done under practical conflict 
(section IV).
(5) Our obligations to our nearest family members – who, as a rule, 
are our most intimate friends – can weigh on us even when we take part 
in acts of government, no matter what political community we live in, and 
these obligations could be strong enough so as to justify us acting in their 
favor and contrary to our obligations to our fellow citizens and our political 
community even in these cases (sections V and VI).
2. On the normative value of friendship duties in simple cases
As we know, in book VIII of the NE Aristotle states that one ought, if and however one can, to fulfill one’s duties towards 
one’s friends, and to do so voluntarily (NE VIII 13, 1163a1-10; VIII 14, 
1163b12-19)1. If we ask why is that so, the answer that first suggests itself is 
that to fulfil our obligations to our friends is to act justly towards them, and 
to defer the fulfilment of our obligations to our friends is to act unjustly 
towards them. Although Aristotle never states that, there are many passages 
that suggest it. 
1 Although I generally follow the translations of Aristotle’s works cited in the references, I 
did modify a few when I thought it was proper to do so. As for the Greek text, I consulted 
both the editions of Oxford and those of Rackham.
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One of the first thing Aristotle says in NE VIII is that friendship 
is a virtue, or involves virtue (NE VIII 1, 1155a4-5); both in NE VIII 9, 
1160a6-9 and Pol. III 5, 1280b30-40 he holds that friendship and justice 
exist only and always among the same people; in NE VIII 9, 1159b25-30 he 
explicitly explains that connection by saying that friendship and justice are 
about the same things; and the way he employs the language of equality and 
proportionality to analyze relations of justice (f. ex. NE V 3, 1131a10-24) 
and the duties of friendship (f. ex. NE VIII 6, 1158b1-28) strongly suggest 
that he thinks the duties of friendship are duties of justice. Once we accept 
this connection, it is easy to explain the importance attributed by Aristotle 
to the fulfillment of our friendship duties. 
Indeed, although in his ethical writings Aristotle disagrees with Plato 
on many points, he also agrees with him on several others, and there is one 
principle that we see Socrates defending in many of Plato’s dialogues, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that we have good reason to believe that Aristotle 
did maintain at least at the time he wrote the NE, namely, the principle that 
Vlastos famously called the Principle of Sovereign Virtue (PSV).2 
The paradigmatic formulation of the PSV is probably the one we 
find in the Criton, where it is affirmed by Socrates at the very moment when 
a friend asks him to consider whether or not to adopt a plan for escaping 
prison that he, the friend, has prepared. Socrates agrees to consider the pro-
posal, but he also maintains that the question of whether or not to accept it 
should be put in a very precise way. 
According to Socrates, the only question they should ask is whether 
it is just for him to try to escape from prison, and if it appears that it is unjust 
for him to escape then he must not escape, even though he dies and no 
matter what else he’ll suffer if he stays in prison (Criton, 48b-d). Although 
there has been an enormous amount of discussion about the justification of 
this socratic principle,3 there is broad agreement as to its meaning: what So-
2 See Vlastos 1985: 6. That he does accept the PSV in the NE was held by authors such as As-
pasius 2014: 61, 26-28, Anonymous 2001: 142, 10-12, Aquinas 1993: 1962, 878, Saint-Hi-
laire 1856: 125, Gauthier and Jolif 2002: 323, Apostle 1975: 254, Irwin 2003 and Kenny 
2003. As for the interpretation of those, like f. ex. McDowell 1979: 336 and Wiggins 1997: 
61-62, who hold that Aristotle would be a particularist, i.e. someone who simply does not 
believe in general practical principles of any kind and, therefore, who would never subscribe 
to something like the PSV, I believe this interpretation has been so convincingly rejected in 
Horn 2006: 149-166 that, at this point, a generalist interpretation of Aristotle’s practical 
thought is to be preferred. 
3 On this issue, see f. ex. Vlastos 1985: 1-6, Sparshott 1992: 421, White 1995: 238 and Crisp 
2003: 65. 
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crates is claiming here is that whenever we must choose between exclusive 
and exhaustive alternatives which are, respectively, just and unjust, we should 
always choose the just action, no matter what we will suffer by doing it or 
what we could gain by acting unjustly.4 
Now, since satisfying a duty towards a friend is acting justly towards 
him, we can apply the PSV to Aristotle’s theory of friendship in a straigh-
tforward way and draw the following conclusion: according to Aristotle, if 
an agent is in a situation where (a) he can fulfill a duty towards a friend, 
and (b) he has to choose between two exclusive and exhaustive options of 
which one is, or implies in, fulfilling his duty and the other is, or implies 
in, not fulfilling his duty, then (c) he should always fulfill his duty. When 
we do so, we arrive at an adequate explanation of Aristotle’s position on 
the fulfillment of friendship duties in NE VIII 13, 1163a1-10 and VIII 14, 
1163b12-19.
But even though this formulation does provide us with a better un-
derstanding of the normative strength of the duties created by friendships 
as conceived by Aristotle, it only covers situations of a specific type, namely, 
of the type that is covered by the PSV. Fortunately, Aristotle himself recog-
nized the existence of situations where we are not faced with exclusive and 
exhaustive alternatives which are, respectively, just and unjust, and offered us 
recommendations as to how to proceed on those situations. Having clarified 
how he conceives the values of the duties of friendship in cases covered by 
the PSV, I shall now consider his theory of their value in cases which the 
PSV does not cover.
3. On the value of friendship duties in cases of practical conflict
Aristotle investigated friendship both in the EE and in the NE, and in this second work he presented an improved theory of 
friendship and a whole new book dedicated entirely to discussing difficulties 
raised by this improved theory. It was on this book that Aristotle explicitly 
posed and addressed the questions of what to do when we are under con-
flicting claims from different friends. 
At first, Aristotle tells us that it is not easy to lay down an exact rule in 
4 This much is already explicitly stated in Vlastos 1985: 6 –which was reprinted in Vlastos 
1991: 200-232. The formulation offered by Vlastos was hailed as ‘definitive’ in Kahn 1992: 
234, and since then it has been explicitly retaken, f. ex., in Sparshott 1992: 421, Irwin 
1992: 253, Moravcsik 1993: 208-209 and White 1995: 238.
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these cases because they vary indefinitely in greatness, smallness, nobility and 
necessity (megéthei kaì mikroteti kaì to kalo kaì anankaío, NE IX 2, 1164b23-
31). Nevertheless, he does gives us the following general solution to the 
problem posed by them.
As a general rule one ought to return services rendered rather than do favors 
to one’s comrades, just as one ought to pay back a loan to a creditor rather 
than give the money to a friend. Yet perhaps even this rule is not without 
exceptions. For example, suppose one has been ransomed from brigands; 
ought one to ransom one’s ransomer in turn, whoever he may be – or even 
if he has not been captured himself but asks for his money back, ought one 
to repay him – or ought one to ransom one’s own father? For it is thought 
to be a man’s duty to ransom his father even before himself. As a general rule 
then, as has been said, one ought to pay back a debt, but if the balance of 
nobility and necessity (to kalo he to anankaío) is on the side of employing 
the money for a gift, then one ought to decide in favor of the gift. (NE IX 
2, 1164b31-1165a5). 
As we can see, in this passage Aristotle is analyzing two cases where 
an agent has to choose between satisfying duties of friendship owed to di-
fferent friends. In the first case, one has been ransomed from brigands by a 
friend and is now having to choose between ransoming one’s ransomer or 
ransoming his own father. In the second case, one has been ransomed from 
brigands by a friend and is now having to choose between paying back the 
friend or ransoming one’s own father. According to the philosopher, in these 
cases we should decide which claim to attend by balancing their respective 
nobility and necessity. 
In what concerns the ‘nobility’ aspect of Aristotle’s balance, we should 
keep in mind that we are definitely out of the PSV’s territory. Since we are 
talking about an individual that has to choose between satisfying two duties 
towards different friends, each of the two courses of action offers him the 
opportunity for just behavior. And since just behavior is noble behavior, we 
can say that both courses of action are noble. Because fulfilling one obli-
gation will implicate in not fulfilling the other, the same agent will be doing 
both something just and something unjust. For, as we saw before, according 
to Aristotle one ought to fulfill one’s obligation whenever one can, and since 
the agent in this case can chose between fulfilling either obligation, then it is 
clear that he can fulfill either of them, for according to Aristotle we can only 
deliberate about, and eventually choose, that which is within our power to 
do (NE III 3, 1112a30-35, 1113a9-14). 
In what concerns the two cases that are analyzed by Aristotle, it is 
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worth noticing that one of them might raise some doubts in those unfamiliar 
with Aristotle’s thoughts about the friendship between parents and their 
children. Indeed, one could object that in first case considered by Aristotle 
we actually owed our other friend to ransom him, since that is exactly what 
he did for us and, by doing so, created in us this duty,5 but it is not clear that 
our father did any such thing for us and, therefore, it is not clear that we even 
have a duty to rescue him in the first place. Nevertheless, Aristotle believes 
one would be justified in choosing to rescue one’s father even in that case.6 
In order to explain Aristotle’s position, we must remember that, when 
speaking about the friendship between father and son in book VIII of the NE, 
Aristotle holds that a son owes his father his very existence and nothing that 
he ever does will ever be able to repay him for that (NE VIII 14, 1163b19-22), 
and that both in that same book and in the first book of the Pol. the philo-
sopher says that the family is a community concerned with guaranteeing the 
needs of its members (NE VIII 12, 1162a18-21; Pol. I 1, 1152b12-14). Since 
these needs are what we need to satisfy in order to keep on living, it seems 
more than reasonable to say that the goal of the family is the survival of its 
members and, therefore, that being a part of that community implies being 
obligated to contribute in a proportional way towards the attainment of that 
goal. Besides, as he is considering the difficulty of conflicting claims in book 
IX Aristotle states that “our parents have the first claim on us for assistance, 
since we owe it to them as a debt, and to assist the authors of our being is 
more noble than to assist ourselves” (NE IX 2, 1165a22-24). 
So it really does look as if, even if our father did not rescue us from 
any brigands, according to Aristotle we would still have a duty to help him 
in the scenario described in the first case. But we have yet to clearly explain 
why is it that Aristotle thinks one should rescue one’s father in such a sce-
nario, i.e. why is it that he thinks that the balance of nobility and necessity 
points that way. 
The first clue to our answer comes a few lines ahead, when Aristotle 
states that:
 to all we must always endeavor to render their due, comparing their several 
claims in respect of intimacy, virtue and utility (kat oikeioteta kaì areten he 
khresin). Between persons of the same kind, discrimination is comparatively 
5 On this point, see Nascimento 2017.
6 The interpretation of this passage proposed here is the same that can be found in Anonymous 
2001: 190,1-17, Michael of Ephesus 2001: 470,13-471,36, Aquinas 1993: 1776, Saint-Hilaire 
1856: 374-375, Apostle 1975: 332, Pangle 2002: 135-137 and Brown 2009: 257. 
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easy; but it is a harder matter when they are differently related to us. Nev-
ertheless, we must not shirk the task on that account, but must decide their 
claims as well as we are able. (NE IX 2, 1165a31-35).
As we can see, although in NE IX 2, 1164b31-1165a5 Aristotle men-
tions only nobility and necessity (to kalo he to anankaío) as factors we should 
take into account when making our decision, now he mentions intimacy (oi-
keiotes), virtue (arete) and utility (khresis). The change from kalo he to anankaío 
to areten he khresin should not bother us, for these words can very well be just 
standing for the same factors. But what does intimacy (oikeiotes) stand for? 
At first, the most obvious answer might seem to be that he is men-
tioning intimacy in order to warn us that our affection for our closer rela-
tives might incline us to favor them against what is just. This would explain 
why he thinks that it is hard to judge appropriately between claims of friends 
who are differently related to us and easier to judge claims of those who are 
not, namely, because in the former case our affection would make it hard for 
us to properly evaluate the merits of the different claims. 
But even though Aristotle does admit that one can be improperly 
inclined to help one’s closer friends at NE VII 4, 1148a23-b1, it seems that 
in NE IX 2 he is mentioning a third factor that has to be taken into con-
sideration when we decide what to do, and not telling us something we 
should ignore when we are choosing. This hypothesis is confirmed when 
we look at two passages from book VIII of NE where it is said that wrong 
is increasingly serious in proportion as is done to nearer friend – e.g. that 
it is more shocking to defraud a comrade of money than a fellow-citizen, 
to refuse aid to a brother than to a stranger, or to strike one’s father than to 
strike anybody else (NE VIII 9, 1159b35-1160a9)7 – and that the friendship 
between parents and children affords a greater degree both of pleasure and of 
utility than that between persons unrelated to each other, inasmuch as they 
have more in common in their lives (NE VIII 12, 1162a4-9)8.
7 We will do well to highlight that the interpretation proposed here was already advanced 
since Antiquity, being present in both commentaries of book VIII of the NE that have 
survived – namely, Aspasius 2014: 181,11-15 and Anonymous 2001: 177, 4-13 –, and that 
it can also be found in Aquinas 1993: 1663 and Saint-Hilaire 1856: 342-343. Curiously, 
most modern commentators are silent about it. Indeed, nothing is said about this passage, 
for example, in Gauthier and Jolif 2002, Apostle 1975, Brown 2009 or Reeve 2014. Pangle 
2002: 80 is a notable exception.
8 Although Aspasius is silent about this passage, this interpretation can already be found in 
Anonymous 2001: 182, 6-17 and Aquinas 1993: 1716. Once again, the silent among mo-
dern commentators is notable. Nothing is said about this passage in Gauthier and Jolif 2002, 
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Since the nobility of actions is supposed to impact our deliberation, 
it stands to reason that its ignobility also should, and according to Aristotle 
unjust actions are surely ignoble. Given what is said in these passages, it 
seems safe to conclude that Aristotle holds the following ‘Principle of in-
timacy’: if an agent is in a situation where (a) he can either fulfill an obli-
gation towards one friend or another, and one of them is more intimate to 
him than the other; (b) the satisfaction of both obligations can be attained 
by actions which would be equivalent in nobility and utility if they were 
aimed at friends he was equally intimate with; and (c) the deference of both 
obligations would be equivalent in nobility and utility if they were done 
to friends he was equally intimate with; then (d) the agent should prefer to 
satisfy the obligation he has towards his more intimate friend. 
That being said, we must also notice that this conclusion should not 
mislead us into thinking that Aristotle believes we are necessarily more in-
timate with our family than to any of our other friends. Indeed, since the 
word we are translating as intimacy is actually the Greek oikeiotes, which 
immediately reminds us of the family (oikía), one could even think we could 
just as well name our principle the principle of familiarity. But things are 
definitely not so simple, and this is why I’ve decided to use intimacy instead 
of familiarity in my translation. 
As we know, Aristotle holds that different forms of government 
– i.e. kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, politeia and democracy (Pol. 
III 4, 1278b4-1279ª39) – take place both inside the political community 
and inside the family (NE VIII 10, 1160b23-1161a9), and he also holds 
that under the perverted forms of government friendship and justice can 
have but little scope because in such communities people have very little 
in common (NE VIII 11, 1161a31-b11). Therefore, it seems that according 
to Aristotle ‘intimacy’ increases and decreases in friendships as people have 
more in common between them, and the amount that people have in 
common between them increases and decreases in proportion to justice, 
which means that intimacy also increases and decreases in proportion to 
justice. If this is true, then one may very well be more ‘intimate’ with one’s 
fellow citizens than with one’s own family if all he knows inside his family is 
unjust treatment, while his fellow citizens actually do treat him justly. 
This, I believe, is all we can gather from NE VIII and IX on the kind 
of practical conflict that concerns us here. In the next sections, I analyze 
three other passages of the Aristotelian corpus where we have good reason 
Apostle 1975, Brown 2009 or Reeve 2014. Once more, Pangle 2002: 86 is the exception. 
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to think that this same kind of conflict appears in order to flesh out Aris-
totle’s theory about how we should deal with it. 
4. Praise, blame and forgiveness in cases of practical conflict
The first passage I would like to examine appears in the third book of the NE, as Aristotle is analyzing the so called “mixed 
actions” – i.e. actions that are only done for fear of a worse alternative or 
for some other noble goal. The two examples he gives us of such actions are 
the man whose parents are under the power of tyrant who commands him 
to do something shameful (aiskhrón) in order to save their lives, and the man 
who throws his cargo on the sea in the middle of a storm to save his own life 
and that of his shipmates. Aristotle concludes that such actions are voluntary 
“for at the actual time when they are done they are chosen and we say that 
an action is voluntary or involuntary with reference to the time of action” 
but, although he states that in the second case any sane man would throw 
the cargo at the sea, he never tells us what the man who is under the threat 
of the tyrant should do (NE III 1, 1110a1-15).
Since they are voluntary, these actions are subject to praise or blame. 
And a few lines ahead Aristotle will tell us how we ought to react to them, 
i.e. how we ought to administer not only praise and blame, but also pardon, 
in regard to these actions. According to what is said there, 
(a) Sometimes indeed men are actually praised for deeds of this ‘mixed’ class, 
namely when they do something shameful or painful (aiskhron ti he luperòn) 
as the price of something great and noble (megálon kaì kalon); though (b) if 
they do so without any such motive they are blamed, since it is contemptible 
to submit to a great shame with no advantage or only a trifling one in view. 
(c) In some cases again, such actions though not praised are pardoned (sun-
gnome), when a man does what he ought not to do (hà me dei) because of 
penalties that strain human nature (ten anthropínen phúsin huperteínei), and that 
no one could endure (kaì medeìs àn hupomeínai). Yet there seem to be some 
acts which a man cannot be compelled to do, and rather than do them he 
ought to submit to the most terrible death: for instance, we think it ridic-
ulous that Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play is compelled by certain threats to 
murder his mother! (NE III 1, 1110a20-29).
This passage has drawn the interest of commentators ever since An-
tiquity, and justifiably so. When we see (a) and (b), we have the impression 
that praise is attributed to those who submit to lesser evils in view of greater 
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goods. This makes sense, since Aristotle does believe that what makes a choice 
correct is the fact that it achieves some good – as opposed to an opinion, 
which is correct if it is true (NE III 2, 111b31-1112a1). The problem, of 
course, is that the passage suggests that one would sometimes be right in 
doing something shameful for instrumental reasons, and many have found it 
hard to square that affirmation with the attribution of the PSV to Aristotle. 
Different interpreters have tried to deal with this difficulty in different ways.
According to Aspasius 2014: 61, 26-28, Aquinas 1993: 393 and 
Gauthier and Jolif (2002: 175), when Aristotle said that (a) sometimes indeed 
men are actually praised for deeds of this ‘mixed’ class, he had in mind specif-
ically the performance of small shameful things in exchange for something 
very important – according to his own examples, the safety of one’s country 
or parents. The key here is his emphasis that only something small could 
be so endured, even for such a high prize, for the individual to be a proper 
object of praise.
According to Anonymous 2001: 142, 10-12, on the other hand, Ar-
istotle would be saying that even if somebody commits adultery with the 
wife of the tyrant in order to discover some important secret he will be an 
adequate object of praise because he will have acted in a way that is not 
aiskhrón at all. In order to justify this reading, he says only that “the shameful 
resides in the deliberate choice”. 
The obvious problem with the interpretation advanced by Anon-
ymous is that Aristotle himself states that in the case in question the act 
that is done is aiskhrón. The less obvious problem is that, as has already been 
remarked in Zingano (2008: 149), Aristotle includes adultery among the ac-
tions that are always vicious, no matter the circumstances (NE II 6, 1107a9-
18). That being so, two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that according 
to the Anonymous commentator Aristotle would think that one would be 
justified in performing an action that is always vicious in order to achieve 
a great enough goal.9 The second is that, if we accept the reading proposed 
by Anonymous, the passage simply does not seem to square with the PSV. 
Commentators have also run into problems while trying to explain 
(c). Both Aspasius 2014: 61,31-62,3 and Aquinas 1993: 394 say very little 
beyond what is said in Aristotle’s text, and they both assume that the act that 
is performed by the agent in (c) is also something shameful but small, as it 
was in (b). But if that is the case, then it seems difficult to explain the different 
reactions ascribed to Aristotle for actions of type (a) and actions of type (c). 
9 This is a point that seems to have escaped (Gauthier and Jolif 2002: 175).
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According to Anonymous 2001: 142, 15-16, on the other hand, if 
we are to be pardoned it must be because these actions are involuntary. The 
same opinion can be found in Gauthier and Jolif (2002: 175). In order to 
justify their position the authors claim that if we deserve pardon than the 
action must be involuntary, and that Aristotle actually said that these actions 
are involuntary. Unfortunately, both claims rest on very problematic textual 
evidence.
Indeed, Gauthier and Jolif state that, if we deserve pardon, then the 
action must be involuntary based on NE III 1, 1109b32. But if we look at 
that passage we find no evidence that only involuntary actions are to be 
pardoned. Although Aristotle does state in that passage voluntary actions are 
the only actions that are subject to praise and blame, and that involuntary 
actions are subject to pardon and pity, he never states that only involuntary 
actions are subject to pardon and pity nor that every voluntary actions must 
be either praised or blamed.
As for the idea that these actions are involuntary, Gauthier and Jolif 
have to send us back to EE II, 8, 1225ba9-19 for the evidence. Although it 
is clear that Aristotle does state that in that passage, it also seems very clear 
that this opinion is never repeated in the NE and that the opposite is said in 
NE III 1, 1110a1-15. As many have already noticed, Aristotle seems to have 
drastically changed his opinion on the classification of this actions between 
the EE and the NE, which means that Gauthier and Jolif ’s interpretation 
attributes to the NE a position we have good reason to think that he no 
longer held at that time.10
In order to face these difficulties, I propose the following interpre-
tation. In (a) Aristotle says that the agent does something shameful or painful 
(aiskhrón ti he luperon), but in (c) he says that he does what he ought not to 
do (hà me dei). Now, although vicious actions are always shameful, there are 
many things that are either shameful or painful but not vicious. Therefore, 
we can say that the language used by Aristotle in (a) suggests that he does 
not have the performance of vicious acts in mind there. If we accept this 
suggestion, we can suppose that when he speaks of actions that ought not 
to be done in (c) the actions he has in mind are vicious actions. And if we 
do suppose that there is such a difference in gravity between the cases in (a) 
and the cases in (c), then we can easily explain the difference in the reactions 
that are prescribed to both cases. Once we’ve done this, we will then be 
10 For two dissenting opinions on this point, see Echeñique 2012: 144 and Müller 2015: 
233 n. 55. My own interpretation of this passage of the NE was previously defended in 
Nascimento 2017.
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able to square (a) with the PSV and explain the different reactions Aristotle 
prescribes to the acts envisioned in (a) and in (c), but (c) will still seem to 
contradict the PSV.
As it may be clear by now, what I intend to suggest is that the cases 
that are supposed to be covered by (c) are cases in which the PSV does not 
apply, and that the reason that it does not apply is because they are cases of 
practical conflict of the same kind we have been analyzing so far. Although 
this interpretation might seem arbitrary at first, this appearance must cease 
once we realize that the first and most problematic example of mixed action 
offered by Aristotle is the dilemma of the threatening tyrant, where an agent 
is threatened not with his own death, but with the destruction of his parents 
and children – i.e. his most immediate family, and very probably his nearest 
friends; that when it comes to crossing the line between what is reasonable 
to do under coercion and what is not, Aristotle does not simply say that one 
should not murder even under coercion – even though he takes murder 
to be an action that is always vicious – but that one shouldn’t murder one’s 
own mother; and that the reference to family and friends figure in both his 
examples of mixed actions (in the case of the tyrant it is a reference to the 
agent’s parents and children, and in the case of the ship captain it is a refe-
rence to his crew and whoever else he is carrying on his boat).11 
As said earlier, Aristotle believed the family was a community aimed 
at assuring the survival of its members, which means that every member has 
a duty to contribute proportionally to the achievement of this goal. Since it 
is clear that in this case the only motive the agent has for doing the tyrant’s 
bidding is to secure their well-being, it seems more than plausible that the 
dilemma of the threatening tyrant is actually a case of practical conflict of 
the kind we have been analyzing. Once we understand this, we can see what 
is the difference between not only the acts in (a) and the acts in (c), namely 
that the acts in (a) are not vicious acts, but also what makes the acts in (c) 
different from regular acts of wrong doing which are the proper object of 
blame, censure and even punishment – namely, that in these other cases the 
agent was not in a situation of practical conflict. 
Last but not least, we can now see that our consideration of this 
case is important because it begins to shed some light not only on just 
how far Aristotle thinks one might be justified in going when fulfilling his 
friendship duties, but also on how he thinks we should evaluate an agent’s 
behavior in a situation of practical conflict and react to it. If mixed actions 
11 On this point rest all my disagreements with Nielsen 2007. Unfortunately, constraints of 
space make it impossible for me to treat them here.
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are actions done for fear of a worse alternative of for some noble object, as 
it is stated in NE III 1, 1110a1-15, then we should say that when one defers 
one duty of friendship in order to fulfill another he is performing a mixed 
action, for his end is noble. In other words, it seems that all actions done in 
the situations of practical conflict analyzed here are mixed actions of a kind, 
i.e. actions where the agent does something shameful for something noble, 
although maybe not all mixed actions are actions done in the situations of 
practical conflict analyzed here. This means that we can and should use what 
is said by him in NE III 1 about how to react to mixed actions in order to 
clarify how he thinks we ought to react to the way agents act in situations 
of practical conflict. 
5. Practical conflict and the hereditary transmission of political 
power 
The second passage I would like to consider comes in Aristotle’s analysis and critique of monarchy in book III of the Politics – a 
part of the book has become famous among commentators because of Aris-
totle’s admission that there are circumstances in which monarchy might be 
the best regime for a political community. According to what is said there, 
if a man so greatly distinguished in virtue appears among a given people, so 
that the virtue and the political ability of all the rest is not comparable with 
his, it is no longer proper to count him as a mere part of the state (Pol. III 8, 
1284a3-12). The only just thing to do in these cases, says Aristotle, is for all to 
obey such a man gladly, so that men of this sort may be kings in their cities 
(Pol. III 8, 1284b25-34).
As clear as this admission is, a few lined ahead Aristotle seems to pose 
an objection against monarchy in general, i.e. against any monarchy what-
soever. This objection can be read as follows.
 
And even if one held that royal government is best for states, what is to be 
the position as regards the king’s children? Is the sovereignty to be here-
ditary? But this will be disastrous if the king’s sons turn out to be like some 
have been. It may be said that the king being sovereign will not in that case 
bequeath the throne to his children. But that is too much, and not easy to be-
lieve: an act of virtue above human nature (meízonos aretes he kat’ anthropínen 
phúsin). (Pol. III 10, 1286b23-28). 
Commentators have differed significantly in their treatment of this 
passage. In Saint-Hilaire (1874: 183), it is said only that “it would be difficult 
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to find a more formal declaration against the hereditary transmission of 
power”. Susemihl and Hicks (1894: 437-438), on the other hand, claim that 
although this is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, in 
limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important. But 
the point of Aristotle’s dilemma, of course, is not whether or not the mo-
narchy must be absolute or constitutional, but whether or not the succession 
is to be hereditary.
It is only in Newman (1902: 289) that we begin to find the kind of 
discomfort with Aristotle’s argument that one would expect, which appears 
when he points out that Antipater, who was one of Aristotle’s friends, re-
frained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander 
and appointed Polysperchon, who was not related to him. Although one 
could think that if he did so then the monarchy in question was not here-
ditary, we must remember that a king may very well adopt a citizen as his 
son in order to pass the throne to him if he so wishes. Indeed, it seems to me 
that this is the scenario being envisioned by Aristotle here.
Be that as it may, the most important point we should take from 
Newman is not that Aristotle had a friend who actually seems to have done 
what he classifies in this passage as an act of virtue above human nature, but 
that Aristotle’s assertion about the nature of this act in hereditary monarchies 
stands in need of clarification. Why does this situation pose such a dreadful 
dilemma for the king? When Aristotle speaks of ‘an act above human nature’, 
does he mean that it would be above the nature even of the man of super-
lative virtue, he who we should make our king when and if he appears,12 
or should we take him to mean that this is an act above human nature ‘in 
general’, but not in that case?13 
Although the last interpretation is certainly possible, it does run into 
three problems. The first problem is that Aristotle never quite says that this 
human being of superlative virtue would indeed overcome this dilemma by 
not transmitting the throne to his unworthy son. The second problem is that 
we don’t need to suppose that the dilemma is solved in this way in order to 
explain why Aristotle thinks we should resort to monarchy in the scenario 
described by him in Pol. III 17, 1288a24-29. Indeed, it may very well be that 
he thinks that there is an excellent possibility that such a superlatively vir-
tuous human being actually will raise a son who is worthy of the throne and, 
therefore, that the benefits of resorting to monarchy in this case are more 
than enough to make up for whatever danger this dilemma might eventually 
12 As suggested in Nichols 1992: 78.
13 As seems to be suggested in Kraut 2002: 414.
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pose. For he certainly thought not only that a father must care for children 
(NE VIII 9, 1160b23-28), but also that it was the individual’s responsibility 
to assist his own children to attain virtue, if the community neglected to do 
so (NE X 9, 1180a29-33). The third problem is that Aristotle does flatly state 
that, in the example conceived by him, not to transfer the throne to one’s 
own son would be an act of virtue ‘above human nature’. The difficulty lies 
in explaining why is that, not in explaining it away.
As we know, according to Aristotle what separates communities that 
are governed in accordance with nature and justice from those that are not is 
the fact that in the first group the government is carried out in the interests 
of the whole political community, and not only of those who govern it (Pol. 
III 4, 1279a23-1279b10). Since it seems obvious that naming a successor 
to the throne is an act of government, and equally obvious that a king that 
chose to transfer the throne to the most capable citizen instead of transfe-
rring it to an incapable son would be doing an act that is more conducive 
to the interests of the whole political community and, therefore, would be 
doing a just act of government, it also seems obvious that if he did the 
opposite he would be acting unjustly. But, if that is true, then it seems that 
the dilemma of succession in hereditary monarchies will be a case where the 
PSV applies in favor of the most capable citizen, and that makes it very hard 
for us to understand why Aristotle conceives such an act as an act of virtue 
above human nature. 
Indeed, it seems that according to Aristotle we could err in such a 
choice in three different ways: if we ignore the right end; if, even though we 
know the right end, we ignore the right means; or if, even though we know 
the right end and the right means, we suffer from akrasía. Now, according to 
Aristotle phrónesis is a disposition that implies both the possession of all the 
other moral virtues, which means the ability to apprehend the correct ends 
for actions (NE VI 12, 1144a29-37; VI 13, 1145a1-2), and knowledge of the 
appropriate general principles (NE VI 7, 1141b14-16); makes human beings 
able to deliberate correctly about how to act (NE VI 4, 1140a24-27) and 
about which means to employ (NE III 3, 1112b13-24); and renders human 
beings immune to akrasía (NE VII 2, 1146a5-10). Since Aristotle clearly 
thinks prudence is a disposition attainable by men, it is indeed hard to see 
why he thinks that transmitting the throne to the most capable citizen is an 
act above human nature in this scenario as we have described it.
To avoid this difficulty I want to suggest, once more, that this scenario 
is a dilemma because it is a situation where the PSV does not apply, i.e. a case 
of practical conflict involving competing claims of friendship. If we accept 
this suggestion, we would be recognizing that both the citizen and the son 
would have a legitimate claim to the throne. The citizen’s claim would be a 
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claim owed to him by the king through their civic friendship, and the son’s 
claim would be a claim that would be owed to him through their family 
friendship. Once we have done this, we have turned this case into a case that 
similar to the one Aristotle discussed in NE IX 2. The action that is owed to 
both of them is the same, the transmission of the throne, and the Principle of 
Intimacy would then allow us to explain the pressure felt by any king, even 
a virtuous one, to choose his son as his successor. 
If we accept this interpretation, we can fully explain the dilemma that 
is being considered, and see why is it that Aristotle doesn’t think it would 
disappear in the case of the superlative king, even though he would have 
good reasons to believe that the dilemma probably wouldn’t even pose itself 
to such a man, for he would indeed make sure to raise a son who was worthy 
of the throne. 
If what is said above is correct, this passage adds another element to 
our understanding of Aristotle’s theory of practical conflict. The decision 
of who to ransom is a private one, but transmitting the throne is an act of 
government and, before we came upon this passage, it was not clear that 
Aristotle thought that even in such a situation one would be under a family 
duty to act in certain way, let alone that this duty might be so strong so as 
to override his duties to his fellow citizens. According to the interpretation 
proposed here, it is this possibility that explains why Aristotle’s solution to 
the problem is not to give the throne to anyone who is not of superlative 
virtue, i.e. not to adopt an absolute monarchy unless there is such a great dis-
parity in virtue among one citizen and the rest. For only in such a scenario 
could the benefits of such a regime surpass the risk that this dilemma might 
eventually create for the political community as whole.
6. Practical conflict and political deliberation 
The last passage I would like to consider is about how Aristotle thinks the land should be divided in his perfect political com-
munity, and it can be read as follows.
It is necessary therefore for the land to be divided into two parts, of which 
one must be common and the other the private property of individuals; and 
each of these two divisions must again be divided in two. Of the common 
land one portion should be assigned to the services of religion, and the other 
to defray the cost of the common meals; of the land in private ownership one 
part should be in the district near the frontiers, and another in the district 
near the city, in order that two plots may be assigned to each citizen and all 
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may have a share in both districts. This arrangement satisfies equity and justice, 
and also conduces to greater unanimity in facing border warfare. Where this 
system is not followed, one set of people are reckless about quarrelling with 
the neighboring states, and the other set are too cautious and neglect con-
siderations of honor. Hence some people have a law that the citizens whose 
land is near the frontier are not to take part in deliberation as to wars against 
neighboring states, on the ground that private interest would make them 
incapable of deliberating nobly. The land must therefore be divided up in this 
manner because of the reasons aforesaid. (Pol. VII 9, 1330a9-25).
Although Aristotle is clear about the advantages he aims at when he 
proposes that the land should be distributed this way, i.e. not only to make a 
just and equitable distribution of land but also to avoid what he takes to be 
a perennial problem in many cities, namely, that when it comes the time to 
deliberate about wars in the frontier the people who live in the center are 
a lot more willing to go to war than the people who live in the frontiers, 
many commentators have said nothing about the problem of deliberation 
about border warfare. 
Susemihl and Hicks (1894: 517), Newman (1902: 391-393) and 
Simpson (1998: 225), for example, say only that Aristotle’s proposal justifies 
itself because land closer to the city would be more valuable than the land 
at the borders. But although that would explain how the division proposed 
by Aristotle satisfies justice and equity, it does not explain why it solves the 
problem of deliberation about border warfare.
A different suggestion was advanced in Nichols (1992: 146). Ac-
cording to the author, by dividing the land in this way Aristotle was pre-
occupied with “curbing any kind of warlike tendency in the city”. The 
problem with this suggestion is that the division that Aristotle is proposing 
does not render a decision in favor of war any less likely than it could be if 
the land was not divided in such a way, nor does he suggest anywhere that 
it would. What he does suggest is that he is concerned with aligning the 
interested of the citizens with the interests of the political community by 
dividing the land in the way he does.
This is why we must acknowledge that Kraut (2002: 230) takes a major 
step forward when he recognizes that the problem Aristotle is facing here is 
the problem of conflict between the interests of the citizens and the interests 
of the political community. What is missing from Kraut’s approach is a de-
tailed treatment of the kind of practical conflict that the situation involves. 
As we saw above, in Aristotle’s perfect political community, as in an-
cient Greece in general, a citizen lived with his family on his piece of land, 
and from this piece of land he was supposed to get both his own sustenance 
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and some surplus for the common use among citizens. If a citizen’s land is 
situated in the border and there is danger of border warfare, then there is a 
very real threat not only to the citizen but also to his whole family, and that 
threat may materialize whether or not they win the war. Since their house 
and all their possessions are literally on the battlefield, they may lose it all 
either way. Those who lived in the center could be risking very little by 
comparison. 
The link between land and family sustenance is very important for 
our understanding of the whole normative pull of the situation Aristotle is 
considering. For the problem is not just that a citizen has important private 
interests that conflict with the interests of his political community, but also 
that he is part of a family, i.e. a community animated by a bond of friendship 
that has as its goal the survival of its members, and which depends on this 
land for its own survival. In other words, the problem is also – and, perhaps, 
mainly – that he owes to his family to contribute proportionately to the sus-
tenance and survival of its members, and that the performance of this duty 
requires him to protect them from border warfare in the case envisioned 
regardless of what are the interests of his political community as a whole. In 
other words, his own interests are not the only ones that are at stake here, 
and he is under a duty to look out for the interests of his whole family. The 
question, of course, is whether he should defer this duty in this specific cir-
cumstance or not.
This is where we must remind ourselves that according to Aristotle 
there are three ‘parts of government’, the part which deliberates about 
common affairs, the part concerned with offices or magistracies, and the ju-
dicial part (Pol. IV 14, 1297b38-1298a3), that the assembly is the part which 
deliberates about common affairs, and that matters of war and peace are held 
by Aristotle to be among the most important common affairs about which 
an assembly must deliberate (Rhet. I 4, §7). Therefore, we should say that 
the act in question is an act of government and, consequently, that justice 
requires it to be done for the sake of the whole political community. 
If this interpretation is correct, then this passage adds yet another 
element to our understanding of Aristotle’s theory of practical conflict by 
giving us further testimony to his thoughts about the strength of the obliga-
tions that we owe to our families and those other which are, at least poten-
tially, closer friends to us than those who are only our fellow citizens.  For 
Aristotle evidently thinks that the division of the land proposed by him is 
actually a necessary condition for good political deliberation about border 
warfare even in his perfect political community. This means he did not think 
that his problem would go away even when all the citizens were properly 
educated and lived both under the best of the possible regimes and the 
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best possible government, if the land was not so divided. By proposing to 
deal with this problem as he does, Aristotle is recognizing that the ultimate 
solution to this possible misalignment of interests can only be found if we 
distribute the land to make sure that no family is more dependent of the 
land on the frontiers than any other family. If all are equally dependent on 
those lands, then all will be under equally compelling demands weighing on 
them, and there will not be any family claims of protection weighing on just 
a part of the community.
If what is said above is correct, we can now see that Aristotle thought 
not only that our duties to our families could weigh on us even when go-
verning our political community, but that this could eventually happen no 
matter what political community we lived in. Indeed, if he believed that the 
problem of political deliberation posed itself even in the perfect political 
community, if the land was not distributed as he recommends, it is hard to 
see how he could hold that any other community could avoid this problem 
without following the same instructions.  
7. Conclusion
In section II I argued that, according to Aristotle, (1) if an agent is in a situation where (a) he can fulfill a duty towards a friend, and (b) 
he has to choose between two exclusive and exhaustive options of which 
one is, or implies in, fulfilling his duty and the other is, or implies in, not 
fulfilling his duty, then (c) he should always fulfill his duty.  
In section III I argued that Aristotle thinks that when an agent must 
choose between satisfying obligations he owes to different friends he must 
do so by balancing their relative nobility and utility, and that if an agent is 
in a situation where (a) he can either fulfill an obligation towards one friend 
or another, and one of them is more intimate to him than the other; (b) 
the satisfaction of both obligations can be attained by actions which would 
be equivalent in nobility and utility if they were aimed at friends he was 
equally intimate with; and (c) the deference of both obligations would be 
equivalent in nobility and utility if they were done to friends he was equally 
intimate with; then (d) the agent should prefer to satisfy the obligation he 
has towards his more intimate friend because, in this case, the intimacy of the 
relationship tips the balance of utility and nobility towards the satisfaction of 
that obligation (section III).
In section IV I argued that, according to NE III 1, all actions done in 
situations of practical conflict of the kind analyzed here are mixed actions 
of a kind, i.e. actions where the agent does something shameful for some-
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thing noble, although maybe not all mixed actions are actions done in the 
situations of practical conflict analyzed here, and that, therefore, we should 
use Aristotle’s description of how we should react to mixed actions as pres-
criptions on how we should react to actions done under practical conflict.
In sections V and VI I argued that, according to Aristotle, our obliga-
tions to our nearest family members – who, as a rule, are our most intimate 
friends – could weigh on us even when governing our political community, 
that this could be so no matter what political community we lived in, and 
that these obligations could be strong enough so as to justify us acting in 
their favor and contrary to our obligations to our fellow citizens and our 
political community even when we took part in acts of government.
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